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Summary
Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the best known member of
the Intelligence Community, the bulk of the nation’s intelligence effort is undertaken
by the intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense (DOD).  In particular, the
National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (formerly known as the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)) are major collectors of information for DOD
and non-DOD consumers and absorb a large percentage of the annual intelligence
budget.  (The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), albeit a large and important
component of the Intelligence Community, is more directly focused on DOD
requirements.)  
Some Members of Congress and independent commissions, most recently the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the 9/11
Commission, have argued that a lack of coordination among intelligence agencies
contributed to the failure to provide warning of the terrorist attacks of September
2001.  They have recommended that the current organization of the Intelligence
Community be changed to establish more centralized leadership under a newly
established Director of National Intelligence (DNI) or National Intelligence Director
(NID).  In some proposals, the DNI/NID controls budgetary resources of all
intelligence agencies.  All versions of the proposals currently under consideration
would affect the relationship between the leadership of the Intelligence Community
and the intelligence agencies in the Defense Department.
Significant concerns have, however, been expressed by DOD officials, some
Members of Congress, and various outside observers that initiatives to provide a
DNI/NID with greater authority and control of intelligence agencies in DOD could
jeopardize the increasingly close relationship between these agencies and the
operating military forces.  Some suggest that proposals to make the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence report both to the Secretary of Defense and to the
DNI/NID would place this official in a difficult, if not  untenable, position should the
two leaders have different approaches to important issues.
Some observers note in addition that there are a number of factors already
working to encourage better sharing of information. The USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-
56) removed most of the regulatory barriers to the exchange of foreign intelligence
and law enforcement information.  The Department of Homeland Security’s
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection component and the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) have been specifically established to collate
information from both foreign intelligence and law enforcement sources.  In addition,
new communications technologies and established operational practices in DOD’s
intelligence agencies and throughout the Intelligence Community are designed to
make information-sharing among working-level analysts in all agencies more feasible
and more secure.  This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Contents
Intelligence Agencies of the Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Defense Intelligence Agency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The National Reconnaissance Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The National Security Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Intelligence Elements of the Military Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
 National Intelligence Missions of Defense Agencies: the Role of the DCI . . . . . 3
National Intelligence Missions of Defense Agencies: The Role of the 
Secretary of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Impetus for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Concerns About Reform Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Potential Implications of New Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1 The intelligence efforts of the State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Energy
Departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are much smaller and focused
on analysis; they do not acquire or operate extensive and expensive technical collection
systems.
Intelligence Community Reorganization:
Potential Effects on 
DOD Intelligence Agencies
Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the best known component
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the intelligence agencies of the Department of
Defense (DOD) account for the bulk of intelligence spending and intelligence
personnel.  The National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the intelligence elements of the four military services
work around the world to collect and analyze information for consumers in the White
House, federal agencies, the Congress, and DOD itself, including  military units
down to tactical levels.  Collectively, their budgets are far larger than that of CIA
because they are major collectors of electronic intelligence, which relies on multiple
intercept sites and reconnaissance satellites.  They employ many more personnel
(military and civilian) and, at least in terms of quantity, produce far more intelligence
reports and analyses than the CIA.1 
Although the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) currently has the statutory
authority to establish priorities for collection and analysis for all national intelligence
agencies and to forward an annual intelligence budget to the President, he does not
have control of the execution of budgets (beyond that of the CIA) nor may he transfer
funds or personnel from one agency to another over the objection of Cabinet officers.
For some years there have been proposals to give the DCI greater authority to
manage the activities of all intelligence agencies, including those in DOD.  Many
observers have suggested that earlier proposals have not been enacted because of
concerns by DOD and some Members of the Armed Services Committees that such
an initiative would weaken the ability of the Secretary of Defense to manage
resources considered essential to carrying out DOD’s statutory missions.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks and flawed estimates about
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, there have been calls for intelligence
“reform” or reorganization to remedy perceived shortcomings in the performance of
intelligence agencies.  Some Members of Congress argue that there is a need to
establish a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) or National Intelligence Director
(NID), or to enhance the authorities of the DCI with the goal of ensuring better
coordination. Similar recommendations have been strongly urged by the National
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Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission).
President Bush announced his support for creating the position of National
Intelligence Director on August 2, 2004. 
This report will briefly describe the intelligence agencies of the Defense
Department, address their roles in the Intelligence Community and within DOD, and
note the role of the recently established position of Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)).  It will look at current approaches to intelligence
reorganization and discuss the possible implications of adopting them.
Intelligence Agencies of the Department of Defense
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Established in 1961, DIA manages the Defense Attache System and other
human intelligence (humint) collection efforts.  In addition, DIA is responsible for
the analysis of information from all sources in response to requirements established
by the DCI, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and other DOD
officials.  DIA provides analytical support to senior defense officials, to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and joint task forces worldwide.
The National Reconnaissance Office
Established in 1960, the NRO designs, builds, and operates the reconnaissance
satellites that collect images of the earth’s surface and signals information.  While the
NRO is a DOD agency, it is staffed by both DOD and CIA personnel.
The National Security Agency
Established in 1952, NSA has two primary missions — developing codes to
protect the security of official U.S. communications and providing signals
intelligence (sigint).  NSA collects, processes, and analyzes foreign signals in order
to support national policymakers and the operational forces.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
The NGA, established in 1996 and originally known as the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency (NIMA), provides geospatial intelligence — imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial data and information to DOD users and other officials
responsible for national security.  Geospatial information includes topographic,
hydrographic, and other data referenced to precise locations on the earth’s surface.
Intelligence Elements of the Military Services
The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have their own intelligence
components that are, in general, not intelligence collection agencies, but process and
analyze data, and disseminate intelligence to their respective operating forces.
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2 50 USC 403-4(d).
3 NFIP is defined at 50 USC401a(6).  Funding for CIA and DIA is also provided through the
NFIP.
4 50 USC 403-3(c)(1)(A).
 National Intelligence Missions of Defense
Agencies: the Role of the DCI
Three of these agencies — the NRO, NSA, and the NGA — have significant
responsibilities for collecting intelligence of concern to agencies outside DOD.
These three agencies more directly support national-level decisionmakers than do the
intelligence organizations of the four military services and even DIA.  Their efforts
are described as “national,” as opposed to departmental or tactical.   Senior
policymakers often have significantly different intelligence needs than military
consumers, although there is considerable overlap.  For instance, national
policymakers are directly concerned with implications of nuclear test programs in
countries that are of no immediate concern to military commanders, whereas the
latter could be focused on tactical threats to operations long underway that are not the
focus of high-level policymakers.
“National intelligence” is the term used for intelligence that is of concern to
more than one department or agency and provides the basis for national security
policymaking.  Beginning in the 1960's, a generation of arms control agreements
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was based on satellite imagery that allowed
U.S. policymakers to be confident of their estimates of Soviet military capabilities.
More recently, national systems have permitted policymakers to monitor such crucial
developments as transfers of WMDs, ethnic cleansing in various countries, and
indications of narcotics traffic. 
Inasmuch as national systems are expensive, and therefore not available in
unlimited quantities, procedures have been developed to sort out priorities for
coverage.  The DCI has statutory authority to develop collection and analysis
priorities in response to National Security Council (NSC) guidance.  Generally,
priorities are sorted out by inter-agency committees working through the DCI’s
Community Management Staff of the Intelligence Community and the Assistant DCI
for Collection, to be implemented by national-level agencies, including NSA, the
NRO, and the NGA.2  
The efforts of NSA, the NRO, and the NGA are funded as parts of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)3 the annual budget for which the DCI annually
develops and presents to the President.4  The DCI also has authority to transfer funds
and (for periods up to a year) personnel among NFIP programs with the approval of
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and affected agency heads.
The Secretary of Defense must obtain the concurrence of the DCI before
recommending individuals for appointment as head of the NRO, NSA, and the NGA.
If the DCI does not concur, the Secretary of Defense may still recommend an
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Secretary of Defense must consult with the DCI, but does not have to note any unwillingness
by the DCI to concur in the appointment. 50 USC 403-6(b).
6 50 USC 403-5.
7 10 USC 193.
8 Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, pp. 9, 10-11.
individual to the President, but he must include in the recommendation a statement
that the DCI does not concur.5
National Intelligence Missions of Defense Agencies:
The Role of the Secretary of Defense
In addition to responding to the DCI’s tasking in support of national
policymakers, all defense agencies are closely involved in directly supporting
operating military forces. The Secretary of Defense has statutory responsibilities for
the effective functioning of national intelligence agencies in DOD.6 In addition,
statutes require that the agencies be prepared to participate in joint training exercises,
and establish uniform reporting systems to strengthen their readiness to support
operating forces with respect to a war or threat to national security.7 
The Defense Department’s view of the central role of intelligence is evident in
its most recent planning document, Joint Vision 2020: 
The evolution of information technology will increasingly permit us to integrate
the traditional forms of information operations with sophisticated all-source
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in a fully synchronized information
campaign.  The development of a concept labeled the global information grid
will provide the network-centric environment required to achieve this goal.  The
grid will be the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information
capabilities, associated processes, and people to manage and provide information
on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.8
National intelligence is now an essential part of DOD’s planning and operational
capabilities and, since the Persian Gulf War, has become thoroughly integrated into
combat operations. One media account of the role of national-level agencies during
recent hostilities in Iraq concluded:
As with imagery and early-warning [satellite] constellations, space-based signals
intelligence was far more responsive to tactical users in Operation Iraqi Freedom
than in earlier campaigns.  National Security Agency teams and related Air Force
cryptologic units were forward-deployed to the theater of operations to assist
tactical commanders in accessing and interpreting signals intelligence from
orbital and air-breathing sources.
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9 Loren Thompson, “Satellites Over Iraq: A Report Card on Space-based ISR during
Operation Iraqi Freedom,” ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Journal,
March 2004, pp. 20, 18.
10 See Jeremiah News Conference, CIA Press Release, June 2, 1998.
11 Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the
Military Departments et al., Implementation Guidance on Restructuring Defense Intelligence
— and Related Matters, May 8, 2003.
12 The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, consisting of some 120
officials, has no analytical role within the Intelligence Community.  All source analysis
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The need to integrate intelligence resources has also become more important
inasmuch as
The distinction between strategic and tactical ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] systems gradually has melted away as military requirements
shifted from the nuclear and conventional threat posed by Russia to more diverse
dangers arising from rogue states and terrorists.9
Propelled largely by the need for precise locating data to target precision-guided
munitions (PGMs), intelligence from national sources has been woven into military
operations at all echelons.  Senior DOD officials and military leaders emphasize their
reliance on this stream of information and argue that the national agencies need to be
more responsive to their direction.
Some observers have long argued that the focus on support to military
operations by national agencies has led to reduced support for national-level
policymakers at the State Department and the NSC.  For instance, it has been
suggested that this emphasis on supporting the military was a contributing factor in
the Intelligence Community’s failure to provide advance notice of the Indian nuclear
test in May1998, at a time when U.S. reconnaissance satellites were primarily tasked
with the support of U.S. military forces operating in the Persian Gulf region.10
In recent years, DOD’s intelligence effort was coordinated, loosely according
to some observers, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (ASD C3I).  In 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld sought congressional authorization to establish a more senior position, that
of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)); a provision was included
to that effect in the Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-314, section
901).
Subsequently, in March 2003, Stephen A. Cambone, who had previously served
as Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, was appointed to the position and
his appointment was confirmed by the Senate.  His responsibilities include
coordinating DOD intelligence, and intelligence-related policy, plans, programs,
requirements and resource allocations.  He is to “exercise authority, direction, and
control” over DIA, NGA, the NRO, NSA, and other agencies.11  He serves as a single




within DOD is the responsibility of DIA and the intelligence organizations of the military
services.
13 For background on this issue, see CRS Report RL32508, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Congressional Oversight Issues.
14 9/11 Commission Report, p. 357.
A significant responsibility of the Secretary of Defense is ensuring that the
national intelligence programs of the NFIP and the joint military and tactical
intelligence programs (known as the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA)) are mutually supportive and
not duplicative.13  In recent years the various sets of programs have been brought into
closer alignment to support national policymakers concerned with details of tactical
intelligence and military commanders who need information from national systems
such as satellites.
Impetus for Reform 
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, a number of observers as
well as the Joint Inquiry of the two congressional intelligence committees and the
9/11 Commission, concluded that the organization and management of the
Intelligence Community was inadequate and that, as a result, the DCI was unable to
ensure that crucial information about the plot was shared with analysts who might
have been able to identify the threat in advance.  The 9/11 Commission took note of
... some of the limitations of the DCI’s authority over the direction and priorities
of the intelligence community, especially its elements within the Department of
Defense.  The DCI has to direct agencies without controlling them.  He does not
receive an appropriation for their activities, and therefore does not control their
purse strings.  He has little insight into how they spend their resources.  Congress
attempted to strengthen the DCI’s authority in 1996 by creating the positions of
deputy DCI for community management and assistant DCIs for collection,
analysis and production, and administration.  But the authority of these positions
is limited, and the vision of central management clearly has not been realized.14
The Joint Inquiry of the two intelligence committees concluded that the DCI was
unable to establish a comprehensive intelligence effort against Al Qaeda even when
the extent of the threat had become evident to the DCI at least by 1998. It reported:
Following the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies, the DCI placed Bin
Ladin’s terrorist network among the Intelligence Community’s highest priorities.
The DCI raised the status of the threat further still when he announced to CIA
senior managers in December 1998:
We are at war [with Bin Ladin].... I want no resources or people spared in this
effort, either inside the CIA or the [Intelligence] Community.
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15 U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 2d session, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
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16 Joint Inquiry, Report, p.33.  The recommendations were published separately on
December 10, 2002.
17 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 411, 412.  The Report added that DOD’s “military
intelligence programs (JMIP) and the tactical intelligence and related activities program
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These were strong words.  Rather than having a galvanizing effect, however, the
Joint Inquiry record reveals that the Intelligence Community continued to be
fragmented without a comprehensive strategy for combating Bin Ladin.  The record
also shows that the DCI was either unable or unwilling to enforce consistent
priorities and marshal resources  across the Community.15
Simply put, the Joint Inquiry argued that, although DCI George Tenet put the
Intelligence Community on a war footing against Al Qaeda, his writ did not run
beyond the CIA to other parts of the Intelligence Community, including the major
Pentagon agencies.  Accordingly, the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission as well
as others have urged that there should be a single senior official, having the title
Director of National Intelligence or National Intelligence Director, responsible for
managing the entire Intelligence Community, including NSA, the NRO, and the NGA
along with the CIA and other intelligence entities.
Considerable emphasis has been given creating a single leader for the
Intelligence Community with management and budgetary authority necessary to
control national intelligence agencies of the Community.  The Joint Inquiry
recommended the creation of a statutory Director of National Intelligence with “the
full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make
the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole.”  These
responsibilities would include “establishment and enforcement of consistent
priorities for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence throughout the
Intelligence Community.”  The DNI would have responsibilities for the “review,
approval, modification, and primary management and oversight of the execution of
Intelligence Community budgets....”16
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the NID “manage the national
intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it.”  The NID would:
submit a unified budget for national intelligence that reflects priorities chosen by
the National Security Council....  He or she would receive an appropriation for
national intelligence and apportion the funds to the appropriate agencies, in line
with that budget, and with authority to reprogram funds among the national
intelligence agencies to meet any new priority (as counterterrorism was in the
1990s).  The National Intelligence Director should approve and submit
nominations to the president of the individuals who would lead the CIA, DIA,
FBI Intelligence Office, NSA, NGA, NRO, Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security,
and other national intelligence capabilities.17
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(TIARA) — would remain part of that department’s responsibility.” (P. 412.)
18 For details on specific legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL32506, The Position of
Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress.
19 U.S., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Intelligence Reform,
August 2, 2004.
20 See Andrew Card, White House Briefing, August 2, 2004, Federal News Service.
21 9/11 Commission Report, p. 88.
22 Ibid., pp. 355-356.
There are a number of bills introduced or being drafted that are designed to a
single director of the Intelligence Community.18  In some approaches, this individual
would have operational control of all intelligence agencies, including those in DOD.
Other approaches envision the person filling the USD(I) position simultaneously
serving as a Deputy of the DNI/NID.  Other versions do not precisely define the
extent of the DNI’s authorities. 
On August 2, 2004 President Bush announced his intention to seek changes in
the National Security Act to establish a National Intelligence Director, appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, who “will oversee and
coordinate the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence [community].”19
The President indicated that the CIA will be managed by a separate director. The
Administration plan apparently does not envision the NID having the authority to
control the budgets of the various agencies nor would the NID singlehandedly submit
nominations for agency head positions to the President.20  It is anticipated that the
Administration will submit draft legislation to Congress.
Concerns About Reform Proposals 
Whereas there appears to be no question that a failure to fully correlate
information in the possession of intelligence and law enforcement agencies hindered
the effort to uncover the 9/11 plot before it occurred, some observers argue that the
remedy is not necessarily new organizational arrangements.  They maintain,
moreover, that the main obstacle prior to 9/11 was the regulatory framework that
created a “wall” between foreign intelligence and law enforcement analysts — and
not organizational arrangements per se.  From their perspective, the problem in large
measure involved the CIA and the FBI and, among DOD agencies, primarily NSA
which had to work within the constraints of the “wall” in regard to surveillance of
U.S. persons.  The 9/11 Commission criticized NSA’s “almost obsessive protection
of sources and methods, and its focus on foreign intelligence, and its avoidance of
anything domestic....”21  It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that the 9/11 Commission’s
list of ten missed opportunities for stopping the plot does not cite a misstep by NSA
or any other DOD agency.22
Proposals to establish a DNI/NID would affect the control of the Secretary of
Defense over agencies that are closely integrated into the operational capabilities of
the military services.  Few observers doubt that senior DOD officials and some
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Members of Congress would raise concerns about provisions to transfer management
authority for DOD intelligence agencies to the newly created DNI/NID.  Former DCI
Robert Gates has argued that:
More than 80 percent of foreign intelligence dollars are spent by agencies under
the control of the secretary of defense.  Virtually all of those agencies have
tactical, combat-related tasks to perform for the Pentagon and the military
services, in addition to the roles they play under the guidance of the director of
central intelligence.  In the real world of Washington bureaucratic and
Congressional politics, there is no way the secretary of defense or the armed
services committees of Congress are simply going to hand those agencies over
to an intelligence czar sitting in the White House. Indeed, for the last decade,
intelligence authority has been quietly leaching from the C.I.A. and to the
Pentagon, not the other way around.23
Bruce Berkowitz of the Hoover Institution, has written:
Proposals to yank intelligence organizations out of the Defense Department also
overlook the role they play in combat operations today. The ability to feed
electronic data to units on the battlefield through digital pipelines is essential for
the kind of network-style warfare that has proved so effective in Iraq and
Afghanistan.  Combat forces use more of this data than anyone else.  It seems
odd that anyone would want to drag several intelligence organizations out of the
Defense Department simply to create a new mega-organization whose main
mission would be ... supporting the Defense Department.24 
Another longtime observers of U.S. intelligence agencies, Richard Betts of
Columbia University, recently wrote: “Trying to wrest the National Security Agency
and like agencies from the Defense Department ... would leave Capitol Hill and
Pennsylvania Avenue awash in blood....  The military services will never accept
dependence on other departments for performance of their core functions, which
include tactical intelligence collection, and politicians will not override military
protests that their combat effectiveness is being put at risk.”25
Such views are undoubtedly shared by some current and former DOD officials.
In April 2004, months prior to the President’s August 2nd announcement, USD(I)
Cambone testified that “we early concluded that the relationship between intelligence
and operations was growing closer — so close, in fact, that it was beginning to
become increasingly difficult to separate the two....”  Expressing skepticism about
plans to increase the role of the DCI or create a DNI, Cambone argued that, “...absent
the [current] deep and abiding relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense, it is easy to see the ways in which seams would begin to grow up between
organizations and in which the Department of Defense would not be benefi[t]ted and
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in fact, the intelligence community as a whole be hurt by that split.  So sustaining the
existing relationship, we think, is essential.”26
Cambone’s testimony clearly echoed testimony offered in 1996 by John P.
White, then the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration, in regard
to earlier legislation to reorganize the Intelligence Community: “Confusing the clear
lines of authority that currently exist would make it more difficult for DOD
intelligence elements to perform their most important mission — support to the
warfighter.  In the drive to create a strong Intelligence Community, we must not
damage the integration of military intelligence within the Defense Community.”27
Potential Implications of New Approaches
Consideration of legislation to establish a DNI/NID will undoubtedly focus on
the extent of this official’s authorities to coordinate all intelligence agencies, and,
given their size and importance, the NSA, NRO, and NGA will receive close
attention.  As noted above, the DCI has for some years had certain authorities for the
entire Intelligence Community.28  Presumably, at least these authorities will be
transferred to the DNI/NID.   These authorities do not, however, include the authority
to appoint and dismiss heads of intelligence agencies of the Defense Department, to
execute all funds appropriated for the National Foreign Intelligence Program,29 or to
transfer funds and personnel among different intelligence activities over the
objections of relevant department heads.  Whether such authorities are to be added
to those that the DCI currently possesses is likely to be controversial.
Depending on the approach taken, a DNI/NID could have only the current
community-wide authorities of the DCI, in which case some observers would argue
that the same tensions that have long existed would persist and the DNI/NID would
lack authority to resolve differences and ensure necessary coordination.  If the
DNI/NID were to possess an expansive version of “authority, direction, and control”
over defense agencies, the role of the Secretary of Defense could be significantly
diminished and, some observers would argue, the relationship between defense
intelligence agencies and the operating forces would be deleteriously affected.
Proposals that would “double-hat” a subordinate to the DNI/NID to serve
simultaneously as  the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence could place this
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official in a difficult, if not  untenable, position should the Secretary and DNI/NID
have differing approaches to important issues.
Some observers assert, however, that even as there is increasing interest in
reorganization, steps have already been taken to improve sharing of information.
They assert that the Intelligence Community’s failure “to connect the dots” resulted
in large measure from barriers to communications between foreign intelligence
agencies (such as the CIA) and law enforcement agencies (especially the FBI).30
These barriers were in many cases purposefully erected in regulations in order to
ensure that foreign intelligence agencies would not be used to target U.S. persons (as
had occurred on earlier occasions when intelligence agencies zealously investigated
groups and individuals opposed to the Vietnam War). 
 After 9/11, Congress adjusted these barriers through provisions in the USA-
Patriot Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56) and other legislation.  The USA Patriot Act
authorized the sharing of law enforcement and foreign intelligence information.  In
addition, the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) provided that the Intelligence
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection component of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) would receive and analyze foreign intelligence and law enforcement
information relating to terrorist threats to the U.S.  Subsequently, the Bush
Administration established the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to perform
integrative analytical functions.31  Such initiatives have arguably torn down (or at
least significantly lowered) the “wall” between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement that may have contributed to the failure to detect the 9/11 plot in
advance.
Ongoing technological innovations are also, according to some observers,
working to remove long-established barriers.  The phenomenon of “stovepiping”
whereby imagery, humint, or sigint would be collected by separate agencies in the
field and forwarded to respective Washington-area headquarters to be processed and
analyzed before being made available to users has received much criticism.
Stovepiping, in essence, means the control of information by collection agencies.
Inevitably, processing, transmission and forwarding lead to delays and impede the
effort to bring all available data to bear on the intelligence needs of all levels of
government.
The dangers of “stovepiping” are now widely recognized.  DIA Director Lowell
Jacoby testified to the two intelligence committee’s Joint Inquiry:
... the more widely information is shared, the more likely its hidden meaning will
be revealed.  Information considered irrelevant noise by one set of analysts may
provide critical clues or reveal significant relationships when subjected to
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analytic scrutiny by another. This process is critical for the terrorism issue where
evidence is particularly scant, often separated by space and time.32
Well before 9/11, the Defense Department was taking advantage of new
technologies to provide intelligence support to its forces. Real-time intelligence has
been especially important in the use of precision munitions, allowing targeting of
specific targets while minimizing casualties.  Defense intelligence agencies are
acquiring capabilities to collect comprehensive data, to provide instantaneous
transmission, data storage, and immediate retrieval at all echelons.  In many cases
processing and analysis is undertaken at sites within the U.S., even Washington-area
headquarters (a process known as “reachback”), and can be directly accessed by
military units around the world to support ongoing tactical operations.  
Observers, such as Berkowitz, have suggested that, rather than undertaking
revision of complex statutes, efforts should be focused on generating “the political
will needed to make all intelligence organizations implement a truly common set of
security standards that balance the importance of keeping secrets with the importance
of sharing information.”33  Berkowitz notes that Executive Order 12333, which
serves a charter document for the Intelligence Community,  is over 20 years old and
needs revision, an effort that, in his view, “would be a faster, more effective vehicle
for intelligence reform than a commission report or legislation.  Such an order could
also resolve the security barriers and other hurdles that currently keep intelligence
agencies from working together more effectively.”
In October 2002 testimony before the Joint Inquiry, DIA Director Jacoby argued
that a crucial need is “to create a new paradigm wherein ‘ownership’ of information
belong[s] with the analysts and not the collectors.”  Jacoby argued that the
government should follow industry’s practice in adopting a standard for data storage
that permit retrieval from multiple users at different agencies:
If we are to achieve an end state characterized by the ability to rapidly share and
integrate information, we must move toward a common data framework and set
of standards that will allow interoperability — at the data, not system, level....
And, the sooner the better, not just for a limited group of intelligence producers
and subsets of data; it shouldn’t be an elective option.  Interoperability at the data
level is an absolutely necessary attribute of a transformed intelligence
environment because it enables horizontal integration of information from all
sources — not just intelligence — at all levels of classification.34
Many observers believe that stovepiping can be gradually overcome because of
the availability of technology for rapid dissemination of operational data and the
press of operational requirements as occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
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Outside observers argue that technological capabilities now permit increasing
information sharing with reliable security protection.35 
The effort to promote wider sharing of information is widely supported, but
there remain obstacles.  Singling out NSA, the Senate Intelligence Community
warned in 2003 of continuing resistance to such innovations:
The Committee has become increasingly concerned in recent years about
bureaucratic and cultural obstacles to effective information and data sharing... 
Cutting-edge analytical tools, many of which are already in use in the private
sector, increasingly involve large-scale, multi-database analysis and pattern
recognition.  Using such approaches within the Intelligence Community,
however, cannot proceed far without a significant revision of current orthodoxy
as to information ‘ownership’ and control.36
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-177, section 317)
established a pilot program to assess the feasibility of permitting analysts throughout
the Intelligence Community to access and analyze intelligence from the databases of
other elements of the Community.  In particular, the provision was intended to permit
analysts in CIA and DIA to access sigint contained in NSA databases, but not
published in formal NSA reports.  
The 9/11 Commission, taking note, of this ongoing process, urged that it be
accelerated.  It recommended that the President lead a “government-wide effort to
bring the major national security institutions into the information revolution.”37  The
Commission indicated a role for the NID and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
backed by the Office of Management and Budget, to set common standards for
information in the Intelligence Community, other public agencies, and relevant parts
of the private sector. The Commission did not specifically address the issue within
DOD.  Whether such information-sharing initiatives, if they are ultimately validated,
can best be encouraged by a DNI/NID with enhanced managerial authorities or
whether they can be implemented under current arrangements is a matter of debate.
There will remain, of course, valid needs to protect intelligence sources and methods
that will continue in any situation.
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Conclusion
Congress has been considering a number of proposals to amend the National
Security Act to change the management structure of the Intelligence Community.
Additional proposals are forthcoming.  Virtually all of these proposals will affect the
relationship of the head of the Intelligence Community to the intelligence agencies
of the Defense Department.  In considering these proposals, Congress may seek to
balance effective coordination of the nation’s intelligence effort with the need to
ensure that the military forces have the ongoing intelligence support that has become
an integral component of military operations.
